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11.1 Introduction 
The past few years have seen an explosion of legislative activity around devel-
opments in genetics and assisted reproduction. In this chapter we examine 
recently passed legislation in Australia and Canada in the area of genetic mod-
ification technologies and reproductive genetics. We demonstrate that legisla-
tive control in this area has a twofold purpose. Less controversially it is aimed 
at providing limits to scientific innovation for the purpose of ensuring safe and 
ethical research and experimentation. More controversially it is concerned with 
what should be the proper "nature of reproduction' namely, how it happens 
(sexually), between whom (a man and a woman, both human), in what kinds of 
relationships (heterosexual), such that progeny, the product of reproduction, 
inherit the blood/genes (bodily substances) of only two biological progenitors. 
It is to this latter purpose that we turn our attention in this chapter, analyzing 
the role of law in limiting, determining, and constituting reproductive possibil-
ities in an age of genetic modification. Our focus is on new and potential tech-
nologies that enable inheritable genetic modification (1GM) of humans, but we 
read these, and their legislative limits, in the context in which they appear med-
ically and legally, namely alongside other assisted reproductive technologies 
(ARTs) such as reproductive cloning. We ask what is at stake in the new legisla-
tive limits, who benefits, who loses, and what kinds of humans are we left with? 
11.2 The nature of reproduction 
Beginning in the 1970s, it became routine to screen pregnant women in high-
risk groups using blood tests, sonograms, and other, more invasive techniques. 
Amniocentesis and chorionic villus sampling (CVS) are now used to detect 
fetuses with anomalies, and therapeutic abortions are offered to women whose 
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fetuses express chromosomal abnormalities. More recently, people have begun 
to use in vitro fertilization (IVF), coupled with preimplantation genetic diagnosis 
(PGD) and selective abortion. Those who are at a serious risk of passing on an 
undesired genetic condition have the option of using PGD to identify embryos 
without the condition for implantation. 
1GM techniques represent the next stage in ARTs. Instead of aborting affected 
fetuses or deciding not to implant those embryos identified as carrying a 
genetic mutation, it maybe possible to prevent the development of an affected 
fetus through 1GM. While this is only one of the many ways in which 1GM 
might be utilized, it is clear that any legislation prohibiting or regulating its use 
will impact on reproduction. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the only doc-
umented instance of human 1GM that has occurred so far is in the context 
of reproduction, namely IVF. Researchers at the Institute of Reproductive 
Medicine and Science of St Barnabas in New Jersey undertook a controversial 
procedure known as ooplasmic transplantation. The process, which has led to 
30 births, is now known to have resulted in children who have a small quantity 
of additional mitochondrial DNA not inherited from either parent.' We will 
discuss this case in more detail later in the chapter. Legislation in Australia and 
Canada has recently made such procedures illegal.' 
We argue that regulatory discourses around 1GM inevitably affect the nature 
of reproduction. The most common type of 1GM is germ-line modification. 
Germ line modification epitomizes the connection between reproduction and 
genetics as it is conventionally understood. It involves the manipulation of 
genetic material in the germ cells themselves, that is, the reproductive cells of an 
organism, the sperm, and egg cells. Germ-line modification can also include, in 
some definitions, the early 8-cell stage embryo which, when genetically altered, 
will probably develop with that alteration in all its cells including the germ 
cells. It may also refer to the cells of the embryo that will ultimately develop into 
the sperm or egg cells. The technique to which germ-line modification is often 
ethically, socially, and scientifically compared is somatic cell gene transfer 
(SCGT) which, it is argued, affects only the individual being treated. 
The view that somatic cells and germ-line cells are not only distinct but have 
completely different trajectories is sometimes offered as scientific fact. Somatic 
cells, it is said, cannot be passed from one generation to another and therefore 
have a finite life. Germ-line cells, on the other hand, have the potential to be 
endlessly passed along to future generations. On the basis of this scientific dis-
tinction, some ethicists and state regulatory regimes make an ethical distinc-
tion between interventions that modify the germ line compared with those 
that modify somatic cell lines. SCGT is viewed as less problematic since, it is 
argued, only the person who is the subject of the intervention can hope to ben-
efit from it (or be harmed by it) now and in the future. We suggest, however, 
that the distinction relies on a particular construction of identity and repro-
duction that need not be, and should not be, assumed. Take for instance the  
example offered by W. French Anderson, an advocate of SCGT. He describes the 
difference as follows: 
Inserting a gene into somatic cells affects only the patient being treated, similar to when 
a patient undergoes surgery, takes a medication, or receives a limb prosthesis. However, 
with germ-line gene therapy (GLGT), a gene is inserted into the DNA of an egg or sperm 
so that children of the patient will have the inserted gene.' 
Despite the apparent simplicity of the statement that SCGT affects only the 
patient being targeted, the kind of therapy that Anderson himself proposes 
belies it. He intends to cure adenosine deaminase (ADA) deficiency by a direct 
injection of a retroviral vector carrying a normal copy of the human ADA gene 
into 13-15-week fetuses. Of course there is no way to "directly" inject a 13-15-
week fetus. Rather, injection must occur indirectly through the mother's body. 
Clearly, then, at least in the case of in utero SCGT, it is nonsense to suggest 
that only the individual who is being treated is affected." It would be easy, of 
course, to dismiss this as irrelevant because the essential distinction is at the cel-
lular level. However, this distinction relies on a molecularization of human 
identity that is not appropriate. In the case of a pregnant woman, there is no 
separate person until the fetus is born. Up until that time, even though there 
may be the capacity to identify different cellular components, those compo-
nents are nevertheless inextricably integrated. The relationship has been 
described by one of us (1K) as "not-one-but-not-two. "5 Somatic individuals 
then are not always just that.' The erasure of the female body and person in 
both scientific and legal discourse about genetics is something we find very 
troubling, particularly when the link is made between genetics and reproduc-
tion. We will return to this point in our examination of the legislation in 
Australia and Canada. 
Scientific facts then are themselves disputable. The purported factual dis-
tinction between SCGT and 1GM is itself founded upon assumptions about the 
"nature of reproduction." For instance, arguments made by John Harris suggest 
that were we to permit reproductive cloning, the factual distinction between 
GLGT and SCGT would be undermined by the capacity to turn those very 
same somatic cells into germ cells: 
inserting the mature nucleus of an adult cell into a de-nucleated egg turns cells thus 
formed into germ-line cells. This has three important effects. First, it effectively eradicates 
the firm divide between the germ-line and somatic-line nuclei because each adult cell 
nucleus is, in principle, "translatable" into a germ-line cell nucleus by transferring its 
nucleus and creating a clone. Secondly, it permits somatic line modifications to human 
cells to become germ-line modifications ... If you ... cloned a permanently genetically 
modified bone marrow cell ... the modified genome would be passed to the clone and 
become part of his or her genome, transmissible to her offspring indefinitely through the 
germ-line ... The third effect is that it shows the oft asserted moral divide between germ-
line and somatic-line therapy to be even more ludicrous than was previously supposed .7 
_ -__- 
POP— 
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In an attempt to overcome the limits of this distinction, scientists and others limit, but (maintaining) surely a sense of relatedness based on shared bodily 
now refer to 1GM rather than using the more limited term "germ-line modifi- substances and genetic ties. iO 
cation." Mark Frankel states, for instance, that 1GM "encompasses modifica- The anthropologist David Schneider has suggested that "kinship is whatever 
tions both of nuclear and of extra-nuclear genomes, and modifications that the biological relationship is. If science discovers new facts about biogenetic 
are inadvertent side effects of other, deliberate genetic interventions (of, for I relationships then that is what kinship is and was all along." Implicit in 
example SCGT)." The moral divide becomes that between heritability and Schneider's understanding of the relationship between biology and kinship is 
non-heritability, which in turn becomes the basis of a distinction embedded in the existence of a pre-discursive nature or biological order that is revealed as 
recent legislation in Australia and Canada. our scientific understanding becomes more sophisticated. On this view, then, 
The purported ethical or moral distinction that has been erected rests on not only do we, as Franklin describes the position, "embody scientific knowl- 
assumptions about the "nature" of reproduction. As we noted at the outset, leg- edges" in that "they describe the nature of our very being"", but our concep- 
islative impulses are also geared towards ensuring that the old parameters of tions of relatedness or kinship also spring into being when scientific knowledge 
reproduction, so-called "natural reproduction," continue to be mapped across or natural facts are "discovered." Within this framework, kinship is the "social 
new technological possibilities and provide appropriate limits. These parame- construction of natural facts." While we do not agree with the relationship 
ters include the requirement that reproduction is sexual - meaning, between a between kinship and biology described by Schneider, his account certainly char- 
man and a woman (not cloning) and that the man and the woman are in a het- acterizes much of the current Euro-American understanding about the rela- 
erosexual relationship (some countries and jurisdictions have legislated to limit tionship between the "facts" of sexual reproduction and the biological kinship 
the use of IVF and related technologies to heterosexual couples) with each other, relations it produces. As argued elsewhere by one of us (RIvI): 
and that, the product of that technologically-enhanced reproduction, has a 
blood/genetic line that only traces back to two progenitors. by presuming that biological ties and the "facts of life" exist [and are fixed], we have 
Kinship relationships and relationships of inheritance are established on the ate a strong rationale for foundational arguments which favor the "naturalness" of . . . . . 
basis of this truth about the nature of reproduction, such that it becomes family and kinship relations. What has been construed within our understanding of kin- ,, . .. . 
. . . . . . ;re 
impossible e to think about kinship being established, or reproduction taking 
ship as natural, then, is a normatively essentialist position having direct bearing upon 
the way we understand gender and sexuality within the reproductive context. 14 
place, in other ways. Changes that come about by so-called "natural" reproduc- 
tion are not viewed with the same kind of anxiety as those brought about arti- The biological kinship relation, as described above, is thrown into sharp relief, 
ficially and with direct intervention, when as Franklin puts it, "science discovers new facts about biogenetic rela- 
The idea of natural reproduction itself has shifted, however, with the advent tionship." For instance, when science discovers new facts that allow a human to 
of new technologies. New ARTs, such as IVF and artificial insemination (Al), be crossed genetically with a pig or a mouse, we must ask whether this alters 
once considered unnatural and interventionist, have become accepted forms of our cultural conception of who we may call kin. And what are we to make of the 
natural reproduction (in part because they mimic sexual reproduction) although way that such new relations also challenge our commonly held understandings 
many legislatures have been at pains to ensure that only heterosexual couples of "natural" limits? In an ironic twist, as Franklin suggests, "the very ways in 
use them.' Human 1GM is the latest source of insecurities about the impact of which we are today connected and related through biology undoes the very fix- 
technology in the realm of reproduction. It has become aligned with transgres- ity the biological tie used to represent." 
sive reproductive practices and technologies such as cloning, the creation of When biological science is deployed to disturb the familiar categories of rela- 
human/non-human hybrids, and the creation of chimeras. 1GM, like other ARTs, tion and identity, it troubles mainstream understandings of the role of "scien- 
challenges us to rethink the normativity of the established relations of concep- tific truth." Underlying all this s a profound discomfort about the connection 
tion, gestation, and in vivo reproduction, in other words, to question the very between relationship and identity. There is a kind of pervasive anxiety that 
"nature" of reproduction. identity can only be secure if relationships are fixed. Up until now this fixity 
Genetic and reproductive technologies force us to rethink not only the lim- was assured by the belief that biogenetic relationships were "found' revealed in 
its of the possible in reproduction, but also the boundaries of what it is to be "nature' and not made. We suspect this anxiety stems from the latent threat to 
human. The anthropologist Sarah Franklin describes how our sensibilities have liberal notions of identity and individuality bound up with explicit recognition 
already shifted significantly when we can view "a cryopreserved embryo sus- of the inevitability and inescapabiity of relationship. This concept of inevitabil- 
pended in a liquid nitrogen tank (as) a biological relative/' as do many couples ity is only acceptable when it can be removed from the realm of choice and 
undergoing IVF. Franklin describes this as "kinship shorn of a sense of natural instead firmly ascribed to a very particular construction of "nature" that favors 
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the liberal subject but yet, in the lexicon of naturalness, is beyond our capacity 
to influence or change. 
From this perspective, as 1GM has the potential to create new kinds and 
forms of biological kinship, it may also encourage us to revise kinship along 
radically different lines. In our view, we must not recreate the errors of past 
legal and social reasoning by attempting to "find" kinship on the basis of 
processes at the cellular or molecular level. Kinship is, and should be, based on 
social relationships established by embodied persons. The fear that motivates 
legislative prohibitions of 1GM is based on the spurious construction of human 
kinship on the basis of invisible processes at the sub-cellular level. 
Legal developments that prohibit and regulate the panoply of technologies 
associated with (or dreamed of) as emanating from recent successes in cloning, 
stem cell research, and embryonic and gene therapy attempt to reinstate the very 
limits of the human that Franklin describes as no longer present or at least 
under threat. Our focus is on the appropriateness of this role for law and why it 
might be utilized to these ends. The legal scholar Derek Morgan sees the role of 
law in this context as twofold: first, "not just as an autonomous body of knowl-
edge, but as a factor that contributes to - which, indeed, facilitates - the so called 
public understanding of science." At the same time, law has a role in declaiming 
"who we are and whom we want to become, giving a moral and symbolic 
emphasis to law 16  The aim of the current chapter is to make sense of the cur-
rent legislative fixation with policing the limits of heritability and coextensively, 
we argue, with declaring what kind of human (or perhaps post-human) may be 
reproduced. It will become clearer just what those limits are understood to be 
when we examine the legislation in detail. In addition, we contend that feminists 
should look more closely at the way in which science is being deployed to con-
struct law, and probe more carefully what norms of reproduction are being read 
into law. 
It is imperative, for instance, to consider the position of women in the context 
of these recent regulatory moves. As we shall see, while much of the legislation 
that has been passed recently or proposed in this area concerns interventions 
involving embryo implantation and the manipulation of egg cells, there is little 
or no mention of the female body or female persons within the legislation itself, 
particularly in the case of Australian legislation. The Canadian legislation is 
notable for its specific recognition of the role that women play in reproduction. 
In the Assisted Human Reproduction Act discussed in detail below, a set of prin-
ciples are articulated.  17  Principle c states: "while all persons are affected by these 
technologies, women more than men are directly and significantly affected by 
their application and the health and well-being of women must be protected in 
the application of these technologies." In both cases what is overtly policed is the 
fertility of the scientific imagination. As we shall argue, more often than not the 
body as flesh is unhinged from any self. In this chapter, we offer an alternative 
feminist legal response that does not reify a specific construct of nature.  
The initial and most intriguing question, however, is the following: what is 
it about technologically-induced 1GM that could call an unusual coalition of 
feminists and conservatives into being and get them to push collaboratively for 
legislative change? 
11.3 What's wrong with artificial inheritable change? 
A large cohort of feminists, disability activists, and progressive thinkers are lin-
ing up with moral conservatives to argue for the legal prohibition of human 
1GM and cloning technologies. To the extent that their reasoning derives from 
concerns that human cloning and 1GM may promote unethical experimenta-
tion on women and children, and that both are grossly underdeveloped and 
even dangerous, it is clear the argument is unimpeachable. Feminists are on 
firm ground opposing unauthorized experimentation on the bodies of women 
and children in the name of genetic technology and scientific development. 
But why is a general prohibition favored, rather than a regulatory regime in 
which practice and research is subject to ethics approval? In both Australia and 
Canada, medical practice and scientific research are governed by ethical guide-
lines applied by university, hospital, and other institutional ethics committees. 
In the case of publicly-funded research, research funding is dependent on 
requisite approval by the relevant ethics committee and adherence to profes-
sional and regulatory guidelines. In the case of 1GM, it is clear that even if the 
research or practice was shown to be safe and developed in accordance with 
approved ethical guidelines, it would nevertheless be argued that it should be 
prohibited. In other words, the concern here is not just with safe and ethical 
conduct of experiments and medical treatment on humans. Instead, 1GM is 
seen in and of itself as a moral wrong. 
11.3.1 Designer babies: simply unnatural? 
A number of feminist commentators have argued that the use of 1GM will alien-
ate women from the reproductive process. It would, they argue, fundamentally 
undermine maternal autonomy and result in market control of baby design and 
production.1' Further, there is a fear that genetic technologies will go beyond 
"therapeutic" purposes - to prevent the inheritance of lethal genetic diseases in 
families - and rather be used to "improve' as Frankel writes, "human traits that 
without intervention would be within the range of what is commonly regarded 
as normal, or improving them beyond what is needed to maintain or restore good 
health."" Desirable characteristics will be chosen not by governments, as they 
were in eugenic programs of the past, but by individuals exercising free choice 
to enhance the life chances of their offspring. The offerings of the marketplace 
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will create the citizen with the best advantage in the global marketplace: the 
compliant corporate citizen. 
Disability activists perceive the idea of "enhancement" as fundamentally flawed 
in its overvaluation of certain traits and undervaluation of others.  20 They rightly 
point out that discourses and practices aimed at enhancement reinforce an indi-
vidualized and medicalized model of disability, rather than locating disability in 
a network of exclusionary attitudinal, environmental, and economic barriers .21 
Moreover, as the President's Council on Bioethics in the U.S.A. noted: "both 
enhancement and therapy are bound up with, and absolutely dependent on, the 
inherently complicated idea of health and the always controversial idea of nor-
mality... The distinction rests on the assumption that there is a natural human 
"whole" whose healthy functioning is the goal of therapeutic medicine.  1112  Kerry 
Taylor and one of us (RM) have argued that: 
"Normalcy" is used to rationalize medical attempts to eradicate our differences, and to 
render all bodies alike - healthy and interchangeable ... It is conceivable that genetic 
enhancements of normal human functions, if sufficiently valuable and widespread, 
might lead us to revise upward our conception of normal species functioning, with the 
result that where we draw the line between health and disease, and hence between 
enhancement and treatment, would correspondingly change. If this occurred, we might 
come to view certain interventions as being required by justice ... if such enhancements 
became widespread we might come to regard a person who lacked them as suffering 
from an adverse departure from normal functioning 23  The normal is a cultural and bio-
logical imperative, which represents the average, both physically and morally. It also is a 
means to justify and preserve the status quo. The "average man" [sic] was constructed 
based on the average of all human attributes in a given country.24 Thus, the average bod 
became the ideal against which all others are measured. All variations within bodies 
became characterized in terms of variation from the normal state ... It also creates the 
existence of deviations from that norm or, when applied to the body as the site of idem 
tity, the presence of "abnormal" persons within a population. In addition to being a 
quantitative marker of human variability, the normal is a powerful normative tool that 
is used to determine and rationalize the extent to which certain persons fall outside the 
boundaries of moral responsibility.25 
It is not surprising then that feminists, disability activists, and other progressive 
thinkers are concerned about the deleterious social and justice impacts of 
enhancement technologies associated with 1GM. However, we need to ask 
whether there is anything new in the differential distribution and valuation of 
particular traits. Or, is the difference in the case of 1GM one of luck versus 
design, nature versus artifice? The legitimate concern described above veers into 
dangerous terrain, when the defense of human rights, especially women's rights, 
is conflated with the defense of "nature." Typical objections about enhancement 
seem to fit that bill. This occurs for instance, when feminists including Judith 
Levine are concerned that "genetic engineering designs in inequality' She argues 
that genetic engineering "will artificially confer heritable advantages only on those  
who can afford to buy them",` and implies that natural advantages are neutral 
and have no impact on social justice and equity. Obviously, it needs to be asked 
how heritable advantages came to be "advantages" in the first place. 
In addition to this implicit valorization of the natural, some radical feminist 
critiques explicitly rely upon it. They critique various forms of reproductive 
technologies as fundamentally disruptive of the natural and proper link 
between the woman and her maternal identity.27 However, the problem with 
this sort of argument is, as Margrit Shildrick writes, that "it assumes certain 
fixed modes of female being ... it implicitly counterposes natural with techno-
logical reproduction ... [and] relies on a closure of identity that in fact may 
inhibit women's interests."28 
11,3.2 The critique of genetic determinism 
Having argued that the problem with genetic enhancement technologies is that 
they have a differential impact in terms of equity, it should be noted that feminist 
and progressive thinkers are also critical of the accuracy of this kind of determin-
ist genetic discourse. In other words, in the act of formulating a considered 
response to the claims being made regarding what is scientifically possible, one 
quickly falls into the trap of accepting the outcome (i.e., genetically-enhanced 
individuals) as a concrete possibility. Critical pressure must also be brought to 
bear on this assumption. A focus on genetic enhancement could, as Frankel 
suggests, "... lead us to devalue various social and environmental factors that 
influence human development in concert with genes." Further, as he cautions, "a 
preoccupation with genetic enhancement may place too much emphasis on the 
genes and ultimately prevent us from solving problems that are really embedded 
in the structure of our society.1129 
At various times in the history of genetic research, claims have been made 
about possible indicators, markers or genetic identifiers for things such as alco-
holism, homosexuality, violence, criminality, and so on. The effect of these 
kinds of claims has been to displace or dismiss more speculative, analytical dis-
courses such as psychoanalysis, psychology, sociology, and anthropology. We 
need to remind ourselves that what we understand as "criminal' for example, 
is indeed academic. It is a concept that only makes sense within the sociologi-
cal discourse that produced it. Genetic discourse borrows from the social sci-
ences, identifies particular sociological traits as genetic, and then looks for a 
gene. Traits such as violence, intelligence, and so on, are treated as if they have 
a kind of scientific actuality without subjecting them to interpretive work. 
Richard Lewontin reminds us, however, that "science, like other productive 
activities, like the state, the family, sport, is a social institution completely inte-
grated into and influenced by the structure of all our social institutions."30 
Claims about genetic modification and what can be achieved thus must be 
viewed as contingent, always contestable, and remarkably political. 
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11.3.3 What is so distinctive about 1GM? 
Responses to 1GM must also be read against the technologies that currently 
exist and are legal. \Nhy does 1GM generate more concern than existing tech-
nologies that demand what some have termed "responsible" reproduction 
through selective abortion? Put another way, these arguments, while impor-
tant, are not distinctive to 1GM but are equally applicable to a wider range of 
practices that affect somatic cells. Nikolas Rose argues, for instance, that "by the 
start of the twenty-first century, hopes, fears, decisions and life-routines shaped 
in terms of risks and possibilities in corporeal and biological existence had 
come to supplant almost all others as organizing principles of a life of pru-
dence, responsibility; and choice."" Technologies such as CVS, amniocentesis, 
and PGD are becoming routine, particularly for pregnant women over the age 
of 35. Then why does the specter of changing the germ-line animate legislatures 
to act prohibitively? 32 
One argument for the differential response is offered by Frankel, who claims 
that: 
enhancement by genetics is ... qualitatively different from enhancement by other 
means. Existing methods of enhancement ... are not biologically intrusive in a manner 
that will significantly shape our evolutionary course. Inheritable genetic enhancement 
would have long-term effects on persons yet to be born. Thus we have little, if any, prece-
dent for this way of using 1GM We would be venturing into unknown territory,  but 
without any sense of where the boundaries should lie, much less with an understanding 
of what it means to cross such boundaries .33 
But we routinely make decisions that will have long-term consequences on per-
sons yet to be born - we make decisions to procreate and give life to individu-
als without their consent (the adolescent refrain "I never asked to be born" is 
evidence enough). We routinely alter environments with irreversible conse-
quences (think of any number of activities - pollution, building high-rises, 
sending rockets to the moon), and intervene in political activities, but because 
these are changes to the environment, they are somehow less constitutive of 
the individual, somehow less integral to identity. Not only are environmental 
factors significant on their own, but the new genetics itself reveals the extent 
to which phenotypes result from complex interactions between genes and 
environment. This should caution us to investigate what resides at the intersec-
tion of genes and environment, and not to focus on one over the other. What 
Frankel's words indicate instead, we suggest, is an alarmist concern with the 
scrutiny of boundaries and the dangers of boundary transgression. In our view, 
this anxiety stems from fears about the vulnerability of bounded notions of the 
liberal self in the face of new genetic combinations. Later in this chapter, we 
return to this central anxiety which motivates much of the legislation in the 
area and claims for law the role of policing those boundaries against unnatu-
ral34 transgression. 
11.3.4 The common heritage pool 
Another argument developed (and later discounted) by Mark Frankel and 
Audrey Chapman in their report assessing the ethical and social implications of 
human 1GM is that future generations have a right to inherit an unmodified 
gene pool because the gene pool represents their "genetic patrimony" as the 
"common heritage of our species."" The Universal Declaration on the Human 
Genome and Human Rights seems to accord with that position, for instance 
when it states in Article 1, that: 
The human genome underlies the fundamental unity of all members of the human fam-
ily, as well as the recognition of their inherent dignity and diversity. In a symbolic sense, 
it is the heritage of humanity.36 
Frankel and Chapman also point to the claim made in the resolution adopted 
by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on genetic engineer-
ing, which states that: 
the rights to life and lo human dignity protected by Articles 2 and 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights imply the right to inherit a genetic pattern which has not 
been artificially changed .37 
In response to this argument, Frankel and Chapman insist that: 
The human gene pool is a heuristic abstraction, not a natural object and lacks a material 
referent in nature. Individuals inherit a specific set of genes derived from their parents. 
Thus from a biomedical perspective, there is no intergeneration "human germ line" that 
could serve as an asset to the future. 38 
A single human gene pool is, as Frankel and Chapman suggest, a linguistic arti-
fice. Yet, there is no doubt that the introduction of inheritable genetically-modified 
genes will impact on future generations even if only in a miniscule way. It is 
therefore more useful to think about the modifications themselves as comprising 
a small pool of genetic resources. Viewed in this way, the concern shifts from one 
of changing or harming the human gene pool, to one about accessing or control-
ling the reservoir of genetic material that can be drawn upon to make required 
modifications. Assumptions should not be made, however, about likely prefer-
ences for particular types of genetic modifications. It would be easy to take the 
view that modifications that correct serious illness should be publicly available 
and distinguished from those which are merely enhancing and socially desirable. 
Indeed, one can imagine the latter forming part of a new commodity culture. 
However, in our view even this broad distinction is fraught with serious eth-
ical concerns. The line between these two criteria will always be determined at 
the level of context and situated desire. For instance, while some might con-
sider that deafness is an illness that should be corrected, others may view deaf-
ness as an enhancement.39  Consider for instance the case of a deaf lesbian couple 
in the U.S.A. who deliberately created a deaf child: Sharon Duchesneau and 
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Candy McCullough used their own sperm donor, a deaf friend with five gener-
ations of deafness in his family, to ensure the birth of a deaf child. They argued 
that deafness was a defining factor in their cultural identity.4° In light of examples 
such as this one, it is far more likely that any market in technologies for 1GM will 
be niche-driven rather than a resource for some non-existent entity called "the 
common humanity." On the contrary, it is likely that corporations will compete 
to market genetic traits that serve specific groupings of individuals. 
11.3.5 Reproductive agency for women 
What about the argument that 1GM as a new reproductive technology; like 
those that have gone before it, is a tool for women that offers them greater con-
trol and agency in the reproductive process? These women, it is suggested, 
would otherwise see themselves as subject to their reproductive biological fate. 
It is clear that "reproductive choice" is another one of those ideas like health, 
normality, and naturalness, whose meaning shifts with the technology. Some 
feminists, including Abby Lippman, see the plethora of "choice" as artificially 
manufacturing needs. She suggests that women will find themselves increas-
ingly subject to external notions of responsibility and risk avoidance.4' As each 
new technological advance is seamlessly incorporated into the experiential 
a t; matrix of the pregnant woman, it becomes internalized and naturalized, and 
new demands to reproduce responsibly follow. Rose argues for instance that 
In advanced liberal democracies, biological identity becomes bound up with more gen-
eral norms of enterprising, self-actualising, responsible personhood.42 
Importantly, however, Rose goes on to argue that the new biomedicine is not 
individualizing to the extent that "at risk' groups are joining into groups and 
organisations, not merely demanding public provision and rights but making 
their own claims on the deployment of biomedical technologies and the direc-
tion of biomedical research ."43  He sees a contradiction in the new legal species 
of human rights based on simple existence, or what he terms "biological citi-
zenship." While such rights suggest each human life is of equal worth, he notes 
that these rights have to be read against an equally powerful "biological ethics 
and genetic responsibility." According to Rose: 
As biomedical technique has extended choice to the very fabric of vital existence, we are 
faced with the inescapable task of deliberating about the worth of different human lives 
this politics is not one in which authorities claim - or are given - the power to make such 
judgments in the name of quality of the population or the health of the gene pool. On the 
one hand, in the new forms of pastoral power that are taking shape in and around our 
genetics and our biology, these questions about the value of life itself infuse the everyday 
judgments, vocabularies, techniques and actions of all those professionals of vitality: doc-
tors, genetic counsellors, research scientists and drug companies among them, and entan-
gle them all in ethics and ethnopolitics. And, on the other hand, the politics of life itself  
poses these questions to each of us - in our own lives, in those of our families and in the new 
associations that link us to others with whom we share aspects of our biological identity. 44 
Recent legislative interventions in Australia and Canada do, however, suggest 
that the authorities are claiming a right to make judgments about the worth of 
different human lives. Indeed, a new tension is emerging between an ethic of 
choice where, with our internalized responsibilities, we make decisions about 
our genetic futures that may or may not have us becoming trans- or post-
human, and a human rights of genetics, where governments at the national and 
international level take control of human futures by determining for us the 
outer limits of how and with whom we may reproduce. In other words, human 
rights instruments seem more concerned with policing the outer limits of the 
human than protecting those that are born in excess of those limits. 
A vignette, recounted recently in the Village Voice, helps to illustrate this 
point. A story about "supertots and frankenkids" reminds us that while we may 
be approaching that day when wealthy parents may pay to have genetic 
"enhancements" to their progeny, the law is currently more concerned about 
"banning their birth than in protecting their interests."45 There is no guarantee 
that prohibiting the creation of specified biological entities will, in fact, prevent 
the feared experiments from occurring. It is possible, instead, that the legislative 
ban might have the perverse effect of prejudicing the interests of the persons or 
entities born of such experimentation, thus denying them the status of humans 
and depriving them of the enjoyment of any ancillary rights. As the Village Voice 
article points out, this is the future conjured up by the comic strip and movie 
"X-Men" and is modeled on the treatment meted out today to undocumented 
aliens, illegal migrants, or, in the past, to women, African slaves, aboriginal peo-
ples, and people of color generally. While science looks forward, law looks back-
wards.  46  Law is more effective in determining and allocating interests than it is 
at defining possibilities in the real world. It is better at defining "illegitimate" off-
spring than in preventing them from coming into the world .41 Policing natural 
reproduction ends in policing the persons that result from unnatural (trans-
gressive) reproduction. According to Erik Baard, "the rights of such unusual 
progeny are being curtailed before the people even exist. "4' Far from drawing 
actual limits on nature and science then, statutory prohibitions that police the 
boundaries of the human end up determining who we may call kin. 
We want to suggest that legal and regulatory responses to 1GM ought to 
embrace "the exhilarating prospect of getting out of some of the old boxes and 
opening up new ways of thinking about what being human means  .114' In order 
to understand why this is important to a feminist legal ethic, we need to recog-
nize that, to date, a legal, liberal conception of the human person has prevailed 
that applies only to a fraction of the population, namely those who can operate 
as autonomous selves - who are actualizing beings because they have the finan-
cial resources, the power, and the time to enact themselves in such a way. 
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As we suggested previously, we need to be wary of collusion between science 
and law in the effort to freeze the meanings of categories and remove them 
from social contestation. Science is often deployed to place facts beyond dis-
pute, while law is deployed to place disputes under restraints. Both may be 
deployed to "reproduce" the bounded notions of the liberal self. 
While feminist responses are, for the most part, aware and critical of the lim-
its of liberal selfhood, in some instances as noted above they fail to move away 
from a hidden discourse of the natural. In line with feminist legal theorists such 
as Martha Fineman, we argue that a particular conceptualization of natural 
maternity operates for liberal individuals as a hidden repository of all its 
dependencies.5° The truth of liberalism is that no one is a truly autonomous or 
independent self, but some lay claim to that status by masking or privatizing 
their dependencies. Most commonly, this is done through supportive family 
structures. Therefore we are suspicious of moves that seem to be legislating a 
particular kind of reproduction on the basis that it most closely replicates the 
"natural" and results in "natural reproduction." 
It is interesting in this light to compare the Australian legislation with its 
Canadian counterpart. The former was introduced under the auspices of one 
of the most conservative governments in Australia's history. The latter has been 
developed with significant input from and participation by feminist thinkers 
and the women's health community. As will become evident in our examination 
of the legislation whereas the Canadian legislation appears to place limits on 
asexual and species-transgressing reproduction (animal/human), the Australian 
legislation also prohibits any kind of reproduction that cannot be seen to mirror, 
in some way, heterosexual monogamous reproduction. On the conservative 
side, then, there seems to be a panic about the loss of the autonomous liberal 
subject that "natural" reproduction operates to shore up.5' 
11.4 The legal response in Australia 
Prior to the recent legislative developments in Australia prohibiting cloning 
and regulating embryo research, significant energy was put into legislative pro-
visions that would regulate the control, access, and use of genetic informa-
tion.52 The primary outcome of several years' debate over specific (and now 
defunct) legislation, the Genetic Privacy and Non Discrimination Bill 1998 (Cth.), 
was a 400-page report by the Australian Law Reform Commission recommend-
ing, in large part, enhancement of the existing federal and state privacy legisla-
tion to manage the use of genetic information. Protecting privacy, rather than 
property, is the preferred approach, which is justified on the ground that corn-
modification of the human body is a moral wrong. Human dignity, it is argued, 
demands that we do not treat the body as property. 
There is no doubt that information about our genetic profile joins us to oth-
ers. Each person's unique genetic code perversely reveals who else we are - our 
familiarly distributed network of identity markers - and who else we might 
become - the myriad future pathologies lurking down the track. In a sense, then, 
this is the moment when the liberal individual must face his or her intercon-
nected status. Privacy legislation is a knee-jerk response to the necessary vulner-
ability we feel when we realize that we are all interconnected. Nevertheless, it 
cannot work. Under a privacy model, each member of a family not only has the 
right to choose not to reveal information about themselves but also the right to 
disclose if they so wish. Disclosure will, however, usually reveal something about 
other genetically-related family members. Therefore, a different kind of response 
is required that protects against the discrimination to which the revelation 
might give rise, rather than protecting against the revelation itself. In the same 
way, recent legislation around 1GM appears to be aimed at protecting the liberal 
individual not by ensuring safe and ethical conduct of ARTs involving gene ther-
apies, but by prohibiting the therapies themselves. How should we understand 
this prohibitory legislation? We suggest that in Australia, this legislation is pri-
marily aimed at preserving what has come to be imagined as a kind of "natural 
maternity," which acts ideologically to preserve the supportive sexual unit for the 
usually male liberal individual, namely, the heterosexual, monogamous, nuclear 
family unit. 
The new comprehensive Australian federal and state legislation passed over the 
course of 2002-2004 consists of two primary Acts: the Prohibition of Human 
Cloning Act (Cth.) and the Research Involving Human Embryos Act (Cth.). Each 
of the state Acts is a reiteration of the federal legislation.53 The state legislation is 
necessary to overcome possible Constitutional limits on the power of the federal 
government to regulate in this area, and ensure national uniformity. It should be 
noted at the outset that both Acts provide for a review of their operation as soon 
as possible after the second anniversary of the day on which the Act received the 
Royal Assent. A review committee was appointed on 17 June 2005. The commit-
tee must present their report to Parliament by 19 December 2005. The review of 
both Acts must be undertaken concurrently and by the same persons. 54 
The Commonwealth Acts should be read together with the National Health 
and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) National Statement on Ethical Conduct 
in Research Involving Humans, specifically the notes on the human fetus and the 
use of human fetal tissue (Supplementary Note 5) and the guidelines for the eth-
ical review of human SCGT and related therapies (Supplementary Note 7). The 
NHMRC established by the NHMRC Act 1992 (Cth.) is charged with setting 
down ethical guidelines for research and requires all institutions or organizations 
that receive funding from it to do research to establish human research ethics 
committees (HRECs) and to subject all research involving humans - whether 
relating to health or not and whether funded by the NHMRC or not - to ethical 
review by HRECs using the statement and supplementary notes as the standard. 
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While these ethical guidelines are just that - guidelines - the new Common-
wealth Acts make certain prohibited acts and offences punishable by imprison-
ment. Turning then to the Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 (Cth.), 
section three sets out the object of the Act: 
to address concerns, including ethical concerns, about scientific developments in rela-
tion to human reproduction and the utilisation of human embryos by prohibiting certain 
practices. (italics added) 
It is within this Act that we find the most comprehensive prohibitions in rela-
tion to 1GM. While the general prohibition against cloning falls at the margins 
of what we might describe as 1GM, other prohibited practices in the Act are 
more clearly aimed at 1GM. At first blush, one might view these provisions as 
intended to curtail the production of a radically-modified human being - a 
hybrid or chimera or trans-human. However, a more considered look suggests 
that there is also a concern with what might be viewed as deviant reproduction. 
As stated earlier this seems to be tied to what we would argue is a mistaken cor-
relation between human kinship relationships and how they are worked out at 
the sub-cellular level. 
We should be wary of the mystification of social relations based on the invisi-
ble realm of molecular biology. The critique - or embrace - of post-humanism 
a can only be done from the standpoint of embodied persons and the relationships 
they develop in the social world It is by foregrounding these relationships when 
interpreting the Australian Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 (Cth.), for 
example, that we are able to reveal what may even be unconscious assumptions 
about the nature or naturalness of reproduction. Those assumptions catch us in 
a questionable feedback loop where what is viewed as unnatural is already prede-
termined by particular views about the way reproduction should proceed, 
namely, sexually between one man and one woman. Consider Section 13: 
A person commits an offence if the person intentionally creates a human embryo by a 
process other than the fertilsation of a human egg by a human sperm, or intentionally 
develops a human embryo so created. 
It is clear that some kind of interpretive work needs to be done to assess what 
the words "a process other than" are alluding to. By foregrounding the relation-
ships or embodied identities that must be involved in any process aimed at the 
creation or development of an embryo, we can see that a requirement for male 
to female reproduction is being legislated. One of the ways in which the legisla-
tion masks this objective is by disembodying the human gametes that are being 
regulated. The legislation reads as if it had been written from the perspective of 
a fiber-optic telescope or a laparoscope. If we were to insist upon a perspective 
that embodies the gametes, the legislation might read quite differently. 
This is further reinforced by the fact that the provision starts by referring to 
the creation of a human embryo whereas hybrid embryos are specifically dealt  
with elsewhere (Section 20). Further, a human embryo is defined in the Act as 
"a live embryo that has a human genome or an altered human genome and that 
has been developing for less than 8 weeks since the appearance of two pro-nuclei 
or the initiation of its development by other means" (italics added). A hybrid 
embryo, on the other hand, is defined as an embryo created by the fertilization 
of a human egg by animal sperm, or vice versa, and various other possible 
chimerical combinations. Clearly, then, what is specifically being policed in this 
section are deviant forms of human reproduction: non-heterosexual reproduc-
tion that transfers genetic heritage. Interestingly, the Canadian legislation does 
not do this. In other words, it does not mandate a particular kind of reproduc-
tion. On its face, the Canadian Assisted Human Reproduction Act, does not 
appear to contain a provision similar to Section 13. 
This conclusion is particularly interesting in light of a recent book by Bryan 
Sykes, Professor of Genetics at Oxford University, entitled Adam's Curse.  55  He 
predicts the extinction of men unless we can create a designer male gene. He 
suggests that because of the weakness and singularity of the  chromosome and 
the capacity of the two X chromosomes to "pair up and swap genes to minimize 
bad mutations," the solution might be to fuse genetic material from two women: 
the DNA could be extracted from the nucleus of one woman's egg, and made 
to fuse with the DNA inside another woman's egg. "56 For him, it is a matter of 
survival of the species, but for now, in Australia at least, such homosexual 
reproduction is not allowed. 
Section 15 of the Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 (Cth.) takes a 
further step in policing deviant reproduction. It states "a person commits an 
offence if the person intentionally creates or develops a human embryo contain-
ing genetic material provided by more than two persons." Not only is homosex-
ual reproduction banned, but reproduction must continue to be monogamous 
even at the genetic level. While we know that there may be dangers to any pro-
cedure that involves introducing genetic material into a cell, it is not the safety or 
ethical application of the procedure that is being policed here. Section 15 is a 
blanket prohibition against use of genetic material from more than two people 
in any circumstances. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, this is the one 
area where 1GM has already occurred. Micro-implantation techniques already 
in use make it possible to compensate for mitochondrial genetic diseases either 
through inserting segments of healthy mitochondria (ooplasmic transplanta-
tion) or placing the nucleus of the egg of a woman suffering from the disease 
into a substitute egg (in vitro ovum nuclear transplantation). It is still unclear 
whether this technology is safe, as there has not been adequate testing. Therefore 
it would be unethical and premature to allow these techniques to be used on 
humans as therapeutic procedures, despite the use of this technology to pro-
duce 30 babies in 1997, which was reported by research scientists from Saint 
Barnabas in 2001. The report describes the process and indicates that the babies 
that have resulted have indeed inherited the mitochondrial DNA from the 
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donor cytoplasm, and will likely produce offspring who will also inherit those 
genes.57 These babies have genetic material from three rather than two people. 
In the context of the Australian legislation, one has to ask again why this partic-
ular kind of procedure has been singled out and separately prohibited.58 
Interestingly, there is no legislation in Australia prohibiting a baby from 
having three biological progenitors, as opposed to three genetic progenitors. A 
woman who gestates a baby created from a donor egg makes no genetic contri-
bution to that baby, but nevertheless has a significant biological input through 
gestation. She nourishes the baby with nutrients produced through her own cir-
culatory system, she carries the baby inside her womb, and the baby is subject to 
the same environmental changes, positive or negative, to which the woman her-
self is subjected. Yet the law does not prohibit these exchanges, provided they are 
not predicated on monetary exchange.  59  In light of the Prohibition of Human 
Cloning Act 2002 (Cth.), and Section 15 described above, if all three people had 
instead wished to contribute genetic material to the baby, the law would prohibit 
the exchange. 
Another important section in the Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 
(Cth.) reads as follows: 
A person commits an offence if 
(a) the person alters the genome of a human cell in such away that the alteration is her- 
itable by descendants of the human whose cell was altered; and 
(b) in altering the genome, the person intended the alteration to be heritable by 
descendants of the human whose cell was altered. 
in this section: human cell includes a human embryonal cell, a human fetal cell, 
human sperm, or a human egg. (Section 18) 
This section specifically targets 1GM, but what is particularly interesting is that 
only intentional 1GM is prohibited. The legislation is drafted in a way that is 
clearly concerned not to prohibit SCGT which, some might argue, runs a very 
small risk of altering the germ line.60 What it does do, however, is countenance 
the possibility of heritable change occurring through chance. Change by design 
is not allowed, but change by accident is. Perhaps this would satisfy those who 
perceive the problem as related to certain people being allowed to "design in" 
advantage. If instead the only way in which 1GM could occur is if it occurs by 
accident, then the advantages accrued would be limited to those that have the 
natural advantage of being the one (in however many thousands) whose germ 
cells were affected by the modification. 
At the same time as the passing of the Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 
2002 (Cth.), the Federal government also passed the Research Involving 
Human Embryos Act 2002 (Cth.). This Act basically sets down rules about how 
and when an embryo can be used for research purposes. In summary, it limits 
research only to those embryos created for reproductive purposes that are in  
excess of what is required by the reproducing progenitors. Licenses that author-
ize damage or destruction of an embryo so created are allowed under strict 
conditions and only with respect to embryos created before 5 April 2002. This 
time limited provision is, however, repealed as of 5 April 2005. The NHMRC 
also plays a crucial role under the legislation of approving and monitoring the 
licensing of the use of excess embryos. 
Like its counterpart, the Research Involving Human Embryos Act 2002 (Cth.) 
also defines a human embryo as "a live embryo that has a human genome or an 
altered human genome and that has been developing for less than 8 weeks since 
the appearance of two pro-nuclei or the initiation of its development by other 
means." We presume that the inclusion in both Acts of an embryo with an 
altered human genome within the definition of human embryo aims to cover 
those embryos that may have been genetically altered in their somatic cell lines 
through in utero processes. It also may be directed at covering non-intentional 
1GM as countenanced in Section 18 (1) (b) of the Prohibition of Human Cloning 
Act 2002 (Cth.). Given that any other kind of alteration is prohibited, it is 
unlikely that what is being imagined here is an embryo with an intentionally-
altered germ line. However, it is reassuring that were such an embryo to be pro-
duced and developed, it would be legally considered to have the status of 
"human embryo" despite its non-legal creation. 
As mentioned above, alongside the prohibitory legislation, and operating 
in tandem therewith, are research guidelines set down by the NHMRC. The 
NHMRC has recently issued guidelines which mirror the federal legislation. The 
Ethical Guidelines on the Use of Reproductive Technology in Clinical Practice and 
Research (the Guidelines) are intended to provide comprehensive rules govern-
ing activities relating to reproductive technology in clinical practice; research 
aimed at improving outcomes in clinical practice; and other research involving 
the use of human gametes, embryos, embryonic stem cells, fetuses, and fetal 
cells. 61 
It is interesting to note that the Guidelines do note the desirability of 1GM 
where it precludes passing on a genetic disorder. It is suggested as a goal of con-
temporary reproductive technologies that couples avoid passing on a heritable 
genetic disorder. However, PGD rather than 1GM is considered appropriate 
where a serious genetic condition or disease (including serious chromosome 
abnormalities not associated with a known condition or disease) is in question. 
A single thread that is woven throughout the Guidelines is the right of a person 
to know the identities of their genetic parents. This point is presented as an 
assumption, and is raised in every context where donation of gametes or embryos 
is examined. Given that one of the possible results of 1GM in some contexts is 
the opportunity for more than two genetic progenitors, it is worth asking how 
law and social discourse would manage this multiplicity of parental possibili-
ties. Perhaps this is another reason why, so far it, has been directly excluded as a 
possibility in the Australian legislation. 
PIP,"- 
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11.5 The legal response in Canada appropriate measures for the protection and promotion of human health, safety, dignity 
and rights in the use of these technologies and in related research. 
In response to growing public concerns about new reproductive and genetic Another difference between Bill C-47 and the AHR Act is that the former 
technologies, the Government of Canada appointed the Royal Commission on contained a set of legislative objectives. Although the AHR Act is silent about 
New Reproductive Technologies in October 1989. In November 1993, under an the objectives of the legislation, information published by Health Canada at 
"ethic of care" framework '62 the Royal Commission made public 293 recommen the time that precursor draft legislation was introduced states that it has two 
dations, concluding that "decisive, timely, and comprehensive national action is primary objectives: first, to "ensure that Canadians using assisted human repro- 
required with respect to the regulation of new reproductive technologies, 1163 In duction techniques do so without compromising their health and safety' and 
particular, the Royal Commission called for legislation to set clear boundaries second, to "ensure that promising research involving human reproductive 
around acceptable and non-acceptable uses of ARTs and genetic technologies, materials takes place within a regulated environment. "67 This second purpose, 
and to regulate and monitor the use of acceptable practices and developments in while not overtly expressed in the text of the draft legislation, appears to inform 
this field. To achieve this goal, the Royal Commission stated that the federal gov- many of the activities that would be controlled through license under the Bill. 
ernment should use its power under the Criminal Code to prohibit practices that Rather than a statement of objectives, the AHR Act contains a declaration of 
"because of their unsafe or unethical character (are) considered unacceptable principles that informs the Act and guides lawmakers in interpreting and 
under any circumstances."64 In addition, the Royal Commission recommended implementing the legislation. Notable principles set out in the Bill include: 
the establishment of a national regulatory commission charged with the respon-
sibility of setting and enforcing standards for those practices deemed acceptable. The Parliament of Canada recognizes and declares that: 
The Canadian government's final response to the Royal Commission is An (a) the health and well-being of children born through the application of assisted 
Act Respecting Assisted Human Reproduction and Related Research (AHR Act) human reproductive technologies must be given priority in all decisions respecting 
which was given royal assent on 29 March 2004.65  In 1996, Bill C-47, An Act their use 
Respecting Human Reproductive Technologies and Commercial Transactions 
was proposed. Bill C-47 contained a list of 
(c) while all persons are affected by these technologies, women more than men are 
directly and significantly affected by their application and the health and well- Relating to Human Reproduction, 66 
prohibited activities which included, amongst others, implanting animal embryos 
being of women must be protected in the application of these technologies 
into humans or vice versa; fusing human and animal zygotes or embryos; main- 
(e) persons who seek to undergo assisted reproduction procedures must not be discrim- 
mated against, including on the basis of their sexual orientation or marital status 
taming human embryos outside the human body (beyond the 14-day limit); (g) human individuality and diversity, and the integrity of the human genome, must 
germ-line alterations; fertilizing animals with human sperm, or vice versa; and be preserved and protected. 
retrieving the ovum or sperm from a fetus or cadaver with the intention of matur-
ing it. Under the various pressures of an upcoming federal election, the proposed Because these principles are enshrined in a statutory declaration, they have 
regime failed to materialize, and Bill C-47 died on the order paper in 1997. greater legal force than if they were set out in a preamble to the legislation. As  
Unlike Bill C-47 which was exclusively prohibitory in nature, the AHR Act stated earlier, principle c is significant and noteworthy in its deliberate recogni- 
combines both criminal prohibitions with a regulatory framework. Since the tion of the unique position that women occupy in relation to the application of  
original Bill C-47 died, and the introduction of the AHR Act, significant reproductive and genetic technologies. As far as we can determine, Canada is  
changes have occurred in the development of reproductive and genetic tech- unique among nations in signaling that women, more than men, are impacted 
nologies. Notable among these changes is the growing interest in stem cell by the development and use of reproductive and genetic technologies. How this 
research and the increased use of IV}-related technologies. These changes, as principle will be interpreted, and therefore the direct effect that it will have on  
well as a shift in attitude towards these technologies, are reflected in the AHR decisions about applications of the technologies, remains to be seen. However, 
Act. Where the preamble of Bill C-47 began with an expression of grave con- its inclusion as a statutory principle means that courts interpreting this legisla- 
cern "about the significant threat to human dignity, the risks to human health tion will be called upon to take seriously and account for the embodied and 
and safety, both known and unknown, and other serious social and ethical social situatedness of women in relation to the use of such technologies in both 
issues posed by certain reproductive and genetic technologies' the declaration 
of principles in the AHR Act provides that: 
the reproductive and research context. 
Principle e of the AHRAct, which provides that "persons who seek to undergo 
assisted reproduction procedures must not be discriminated against, including 
the benefits of assisted human reproductive technologies and related research for indi- on the basis of their sexual orientation or marital status' is noteworthy in light 
viduals, families and for society in general can be most effectively secured by taking of the comments made above in relation to the Australian legislation. Whereas 
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one of the unstated, but nonetheless we argue animating, concerns in Australia 
is the regulation, indeed prohibition, of homosexual reproduction, it is impor-
tant to ask whether similar procedures, if performed in Canada, would or could 
escape prohibition where they conflict with this principle. This is not to suggest 
that procedures that would facilitate homosexual reproduction and that might 
be rightfully regulated due to health and safety concerns would be forced to be 
on offer. But one could argue that where the safety of such procedures had been 
demonstrated, their use could not be prohibited solely because they facilitated 
homosexual reproduction. 
Finally, the inclusion of principle g in the AHR Act, which provides that 
"human individuality and diversity, and the integrity of the human genome, 
must be preserved and protected" highlights the individual as worthy of pro-
tection and objectifies the human genome as worthy of the same. While at first 
blush this principle looks to be reinforcing a liberal humanist conception of the 
bounded individual while simultaneously clinging to the fiction of the human 
genome, one could argue that this principle reflects a healthy ambivalence and 
tension about both entities and concepts. The Canadian legislation draws 
attention to the issue of diversity which may be important in developing an 
interpretation in line with the feminist arguments developed in this chapter. 
At best, diversity, as set out in this principle, is of equal importance to human 
individuality and the integrity of the human genome. Arguably then, novel 
forms are also worthy of protection when they contribute to diversity. According 
to more conventional interpretations, interests of diversity such as sexual pref-
erence, disability, race, and color are also to be protected in the application of 
the reproductive and genetic technologies regulated by the legislation. 
As stated earlier, the AHR Act identifies both prohibited and controlled activ-
ities. Those activities prohibited under the legislation include creating a human 
clone or transplanting a human clone into a human being; creating in vitro 
embryos for any purposes other than creating a human being; improving or 
providing instruction in assisted human reproductive procedures, germ-line 
genetic alteration of a cell of a human being, or in vitro embryo such that the 
alteration is capable of being transmitted to descendants; transplanting a sperm, 
ovum, embryo, or fetus of a non-human into a human being; for the purpose of 
creating a human, using any human reproductive material or any in vitro embryo 
that is or was transplanted into a non-human; creating hybrids for the purpose 
of reproduction; or transplanting a hybrid into a human or non-human. While 
most of these prohibitions cover the same procedures banned in the Australian 
context and are motivated by a similar aim - to curtail the production of a 
radically-modified human being, a hybrid, or a chimera - there are several notable 
differences. On its face, the AHR Act does not appear to contain a provision sim-
ilar to that section in the Australian Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 
(Cth.) which prohibits the intentional creation of a human embryo by a process 
other than the fertilization of a human egg by a human sperm, or the intentional  
development of a human embryo so created. Thus, while the Canadian legislation 
is animated by a fear of species transgression and a concern about cloning 
(asexual production), it is less concerned about homosexual reproduction. 
For purposes of the AHR Act, chimera means "(a) an embryo into which a 
cell of any non-human life form has been introduced or (b) an embryo that 
consists of cells of more than one embryo, fetus or human being." While hybrid 
is defined as a human ovum that has been fertilized by a sperm of a non-human 
life form, or into which the nucleus of a cell of a non-human life form has been 
introduced, it also includes an ovum of a non-human life form that has been 
fertilized by a human sperm, or into which the nucleus of a human cell has 
been introduced. Finally, the definition of hybrid in the AHR Act also includes 
a human ovum or an ovum of a non-human life form that otherwise contains 
haploid sets of chromosomes from both a human being and a non-human life 
form. Accordingly, the AHR Act's prohibition on the creation of hybrids is very 
strong. 
The same is not true of the prohibition on the creation of chimeras. As Jason 
Scott Robert notes: "the definition of 'chimera' in the AHR Act does not capture 
the insertion of human cells into non-human embryos, or the implantation of 
a creature so created in a human or non-human life form." He goes on to 
explain that "according to the AHR Act, it is prohibited to insert non-human 
cells into human embryos or to insert human cells into human embryos, while 
it is not prohibited to insert human cells into non-humans."" Unless this omis-
sion is an oversight, the most likely explanation for this kind of transgenesis is 
the creation of human-to-animal chimeras to be used to conduct research on 
human biology, as Robert argues. What is striking about the AHR Act, there-
fore, is that while the creation of human-to-human chimeras is prohibited, the 
coming into being of novel beings, provided they involve the insertion of 
human cells into non-human embryos, is not. While at first glance, what 
appears to motivate most of the prohibitions in the AHR Act is a desire to pro-
tect the sexual conjugation of human gametes with the result being genetic 
recombination with its unpredictability of a new phenotype, what is also per-
mitted is the limited exercise of the scientific imagination provided it protects 
the boundaries of the liberal legal subject. 
11.6 New genetic futures: a postmodern feminist 
legal ethics 
In the new genetic future then, so-called "natural maternity" is increasingly 
undermined by moves toward deviant reproduction, be it homosexual, asexual, 
monosexual, or clinical. Bart Simon describes the postmodern subject as "an 
unstable, impure mixture without discernable origins; a hybrid, a cyborg?'69 It 
is this same subject that conservatives fear we will become if reproduction is 
216 Isabel Karpin and Roxanne Mykitiuk Regulating IGM, or policing the fertile scientific imagination? 217 
"dc-naturalized." For instance Joan Didur argues, "[g] enetic engineering in the 
lab .. is represented as a violent assault on nature and a form of contamination 
invading the otherwise pure and untainted boundaries of the body of the lib-
eral subject."7°  Liberal subjectivity depends on the exclusion of the other and 
the capacity to insist upon an autonomous, individuated "I." This kind of "1/' 
however, cannot be sustained by many of us when we are pregnant or live with 
a disability; for example. Rather, in these contexts subjecthood has to accom-
modate the other. This, we argue, is not a bad thing. On the contrary, depend-
ency and connection are inevitable relations for us all. If our conception of 
selthood was not limited to untainted bounded bodies but instead incorpo-
rated dependency and transgression, we suggest we would have a more just 
society.7' It is precisely those people whose embodiment transgresses the liberal 
norm who are the most disempowered in our society. Katherine Hayles argues 
for instance that "what is lethal is not the post-human as such but the grafting 
of the post-human onto a liberal humanist view of the self."" It is this very 
liberal humanist view of the self that permeates legal thinking. 
Against this liberal view of seithood, Shildrick argues "the postmodernist 
approach necessitates an ethic of openness and responsibility towards differences 
where none is given prior privilege ... acknowledgement of difference decon-
structs any reliance on subject/object distinctions, and uncovers the assumption 
of the subjective autonomy as a mechanism to police boundaries." Shildrick 
confronts the inviolability of the liberal self with "the leakiness between one's 
self and others While critics of the unstable subject of postmodern theory 
charge postmodern feminism with an ethics of arbitrariness not far removed 
from nihilism, we argue to the contrary that postmodern feminism is not lack-
ing in ethics, but instead has an ethics radically at odds with the ethic of liberal 
individualism or humanism. We affirm (with Shildrick) the basis for a more 
appropriate ethic is a "responsibility towards differences not as the disembodied 
site of diverse claims, but as an awareness of the irreducible but fluid bodily 
investments which ground our own provisional being in the world and our 
interaction with others."74 
The same concerns are echoed by Marilyn Strathern, and Margaret Davies 
and Ngaire Naffine. Franklin describes Strathern, for instance, as interested in 
the way that Western knowledge practices operate to rework the inevitable 
interconnections of bodies and identities through forms of possessive individ-
ualism.75  This is similar to the analysis that Davies and Naffine offer of legal 
understandings of identity. As they write: "our jurisprudential understanding 
of the person is that of a proprietor of self and of the external world. In mod-
ern Western law, to own is to be. We are quintessentially possessive individu-
als. "76  Interestingly, however, this does not translate into a property right over 
the self. Indeed, as Davies and Naffine argue, the "dogmatic legal position is that 
persons are not property."  77  To be constituted as property raises the possibility  
of becoming the property of another, and that would not accord with 
autonomous liberal selthood. 
It is one of those disturbing paradoxes of liberal identity, therefore, that in 
order to retain one's subjecthood, identified by Davies and Naffine as the person 
as mind, there must be individual control of one's object body. It is the bound-
aries of our bodies therefore that must be relentlessly and vigilantly policed. 
But this view of the self as a unitary, bounded, self-possessing autonomous 
individual fails to account for myriad relations of dependency and intercon-
nection. Davies and Naffine argue that: 
the person does not have to be viewed as a unitary, bounded, self possessing autonomous 
individual, always in command of his own being and always able to exclude others. The 
relationship of the pregnant woman to her foetus reveals just some of the failings of this 
view. So too does the relationship of persons in the acts of sexual intercourse. 78 
With the development of 1GM we are challenging liberal selfhood in its very 
production. There is something fundamentally disruptive for liberal selfhood 
in the congruence of boundary transgression through reproduction that the 
manipulation of genetic identity brings about. While some have described this 
transgressivity as giving rise to the post-human, we want to make a clear dis-
tinction between critical post-humanism - a variant of postmodernism hinted 
at in our discussion of Hayles above - and extropianism, the completion of the 
enlightenment project and the perfection of the liberal self. This latter post-
humanist project is susceptible to an apocalyptic outcome. Liberal selfhood 
and transgressive or hybrid selthood can only go together to the detriment of 
those who cannot transcend their interconnected subjectivity. Indeed the likely 
outcome of the liberal self-grafted onto the transhuman is the feminist 
nightmare of reproduction co-opted to the needs of global capital, producing 
genetically-engineered hybrids that are compliant corporate citizens. However, 
as Simon asks, are "revulsion, rejection and exclusion the only viable modes of 
resistance to corporate techno scientific practice"?" 
Any post-humanist future worthy of embrace needs to be carefully distin-
guished from one that simply attempts to actualize the liberal humanist fantasy 
of the self. That self typically aims to transcend its material limits. Critical post-
humanism, on the other hand, emphasizes that being human means being 
embodied. It offers the possibility of breaking out of the constraints that liberal 
humanism has placed on being human. 1GM also offers emancipatory poten-
tial in its refusal to close the parenthesis of relationship and kinship. The result-
ing transgressive kinship can become a step towards the recognition of a 
plurality of relationships and forms of kinship. What needs to be critiqued 
more fully is the impulse to limit legal and social recognition to kinship ties of 
a restrictive type. 
___________ 
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inheritable genetic modification: clinical 
applications and genetic counseling 
considerations 
Joan A. Scott 
It is entirely speculative at this point whether technologies to alter the human 
germ line will develop to the point where they are deemed safe and effective 
enough to be made available to prospective parents, much less considered ethi-
cally acceptable. But even the possibility that such profound technologies might 
be used has prompted intense debate. The scientific, ethical, moral, and social 
issues raised by these technologies have been debated in this volume and else-
where. Missing in the discussion thus far, however, have been the perspectives of 
the couples or individuals who might consider the use of such technologies, con-
sideration of the clinical or research setting in which these technologies might be 
offered, and the impact of that setting on couples, or the perspectives and con-
cerns of the health professionals and researchers who may be in the position of 
counseling the families and providing the services. Additionally, the public has 
not yet been invited into the discussion in any meaningful way. In the interest of 
extending the debate, this discussion will try to anticipate some of the patient, 
genetic counseling, and application aspects of technologies developed to alter 
the human germ line and articulate the need to include many more voices and 
perspectives in the debate. Some may consider this discussion premature, per-
haps even inappropriate at this point in time, but given the speed with which 
scientific progress is made, it seems prudent to at least introduce these issues 
into the debate. 
12.1 The application of inheritable genetic modification 
technologies to humans 
When will bench and animal research have progressed to the point that 
human clinical trials of inheritable genetic modification (1GM) might be 
considered ethically justifiable, at least from the technical standpoint? Some 
believe that there will never be enough data to feel confident of the safety of 
1GM in humans. In the 2000 report of the American Association for the 
223 
